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The main purpose of our research was to determine the main motives for SWF 
investments in CEE countries. We considered if commercial goals are the only 
reason behind their entering regional markets or there are other, political 
motives. If they are politically biased, do they pose any threat for the stability 
and security of the CEE countries?
The main conclusion of our work could be summarized in five points 
presented below:
1. SWFs were in analysed period of time not very active in the region
Despite ongoing convergence with western European countries, the financial 
markets of CEE still remains underdeveloped. It results primarily with their 
limited size that made them illiquid and more vulnerable foe external shocks. 
These weaknesses seem to lay behind the law level of financial engagement 
of SWFs in the region. SWFs seek efficient, abundant and liquid capital markets 
to accommodate their rising assets. The CEE markets are much less attractive 
than Western European.
For the bulk of SWF investments in the region has been responsible Norway’s 
fund. Other funds have been relatively cautious towards investing in the CEE 
economies. Taking into consideration announcements of some SWFs owners 
(e.g. China) we can suppose that those situation is probably going to change 
in the future.
2. SWFs are political instruments of states
SWFs are not independent political actors but rather states’ investment 
arms that can be instrumentally use to pursue political and economic power. 
Therefore, the political significance of SWFs, its stabilising or destabilising 
inclinations, are a function of their sponsoring states. In one set of circumstances 
a given SWF can be steered only by commercial motives, but in another the very 
same SWF can realise the political strategy of its state. Moreover, those two 
motives can coexist in the same time. In consequence, it is no sense in analysing 
the SWFs behaviours separate from the political interests of states that control 
them. In this context also making any strong conclusions about the motives 
of the SWFs, seems to be not possible. They are as diverse and changing in time 
as policies of the owner states.
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SWF activities in the particular country or region could be potentially 
harmful only when the donor state have interests in it. Unless the SWF 
owner does not have vital national interests in the region. the risk of hostile 
manoeuvring via SWFs is limited. Due to this fact, all analyses of funds 
activities have to include an assessment of the political interest of their owners 
in a particular state or region.
3. There are some risks related to the SWFs activities in the CEE
We have found three types of risks regarding usage of SWFs by sponsoring 
states, that seem to be particularly important from the perspective of CEE 
countries. Firstly, SWFs are convenient to use leverage on a host country. All 
CEE states have to actively search for foreign capital and investment promises 
from foreign financial institutions are very much welcomed. It provides 
space for political pressure from states behind potential investors. Secondly, 
SWFs could be used to exercise control over strategic resources or critical 
infrastructure. Thirdly, through SWFs foreign countries could search for hostile 
take overs and getting access to privileged technological and military know-
how.
4. There is no evidence of any hostile actions of the SWFs in the CEE
Neither SWFs investment record in the CEE, nor in-depth case studies 
analyses of three major SWFs holders active in the region, give grounds 
to corroborate the hypothesis about potential security threats linked 
with the SWFs. Hitherto, SWFs investments in the CEE were mainly 
financially motivated and did not pose any major political problem for Poland 
and other countries in the region. Any from the three above mentioned 
risks related to the SWFs operations has materialised. The only one case, 
when political motivation of investments is possible to prove is Norwegian 
GPF Global. That fund officially incorporated non-commercial motives 
into its decision-making process, however in a way that hardly can be 
perceived as “hostile” for the recipients of their investments. Through its 
SWF the Norwegian government try to promote good corporate governance 
practices, human rights or environmental issues, what is rather beneficial 
for the CEE countries.
Conclusions
5. Concerns over SWF activity are legitimate
This monograph has demonstrated that the bulk of concerns regarding 
SWF investments in the CEE is rather unfounded. However, from the fact 
that  something has not occurred in  the past, one should not  infer 
that it impossible in the future. Quite the contrary, we have argued that SWFs, 
being political instruments of in the hands of their creators, may be potentially 
dangerous. Therefore, CEE countries should employ political strategies 
to monitor SWFs investments. It will permit them to react whenever SWFs 
should act in a way that threatens national security.
In this vein, the need to upgrade SWF transparency outweighs any other 
goals to be pursued by host countries with regard to policy choices pertinent 
to SWF investments. Ultimately, an international regulatory initiative designed 
to improve SWF disclosure standards needs to be launched (accompanied 
by a catalogue of regulatory responses if such standards are not met).
It is an open question if relatively small CEE countries are capable 
of implementing an effective monitoring regime on an individual or even 
regional basis. As aforementioned, wider international cooperation, perhaps 
at pan-EU level, is requisite to ensure that benefits from capital inf lows 
are not to be squandered through disruptive practises followed by SWFs.
